Mimicking the herd invites regression to the mean. As a truly active manager, if you're not making bets that look wrong to most people most of the time, you're not doing your job.

We are all agreed that your theory is crazy. The question which divides us is whether it is crazy enough to have a chance of being correct.

Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.

You have to be willing to look wrong for a long time before you look right. The market has no obligation to validate your thesis on your schedule.

The fly that doesn't want to be swatted is safest if it sits on the fly-swatter.

Mimicking the herd invites regression to the mean. You will never produce a superior performance unless you do something different from the majority — and that is harder than it sounds, because the majority is usually wrong about enough things to be dangerous, but right about enough things to be seductive.

Risk means more things can happen than will happen. The practical definition of risk is not volatility or a standard deviation — it's the possibility of permanent loss of capital. Volatility is opportunity dressed in frightening clothes.

Mimicking the herd invites regression to the mean. You will never produce a superior investment record by buying what everybody else is buying. The decisions that look best in retrospect are often the ones that felt most uncomfortable at the time.

The biggest constraint on the returns of a large investor is the investor himself. Most people think they need more information, better models, faster data. But the actual binding constraint is almost always temperament — the ability to hold a variant view, in size, for a long time, while being wrong in ways that are publicly visible.

Mimicking the herd invites regression to the mean. If your portfolio looks like everyone else's, you may feel comfortable, but all you can expect is average performance. It's only by departing from the consensus that you can achieve superior results — but departing from the consensus is where career risk lives, and most investors won't do it.

The lesson of history is that there have always been more buyers of stability than sellers of it. When uncertainty rises, the price of certainty rises with it — and those willing to sell certainty at that moment earn returns that compound for decades.

The ability to destroy your ideas rapidly instead of slowly when the occasion is right is one of the most valuable things you can have. You have to work hard on it. Ask yourself what are the arguments on the other side. It's bad to have an opinion you're proud of if you can't state the other side better than your opponents.

The stock promoter sells sizzle, but the great investor buys the business nobody is talking about yet. Most of the time the exciting story and the good investment are mutually exclusive — the more compelling the narrative, the more the price has already discounted the future.

Mimicking the herd invites regression to the mean. Unconventional behavior is the only road to superior investment results, but it isn't for everyone. Uncomfortably idiosyncratic positions can result in short-term performance that is worse than the market or peers.

The best time to buy is when there's blood in the streets. The second best time is when everyone else is buying.

The best way to think about the future is to invent it. People are often afraid to bet on radical change, so the market systematically underestimates how much the world can improve.

The best ideas are often dangerous ideas. You're not supposed to think them. And if you do, you're not supposed to say them. But the truth doesn't care about your comfort.

The best time to buy is when there's blood in the streets. The best time to sell is when there's irrational exuberance. Most people do the opposite.

The best investment is in yourself. But the second-best investment is often in things that are so obvious and so important that nobody is paying attention to them because everyone assumes someone else is handling it.

The size of the opportunity is inversely proportional to how many people think it's an opportunity. If everyone believes something is a great opportunity, then by the time you get there, it's probably not.